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ABSTRACT 
 
Launched in 2014, the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect (SHSC) is the first mutual 
access channel between the Chinese and Hong Kong equity markets. The scheme allows 
Hong Kong and international investors to purchase eligible Shanghai-listed shares, while 
at the same time permitting eligible Chinese investors to purchase eligible Hong 
Kong-listed shares. This paper aims to examine the impact of the scheme on the 
effectiveness of the price limit rule, which is only imposed in China but not in Hong Kong. 
Results show that the scheme alleviates the delayed price discovery problem caused by 
price limits but has no significant effect on the problems of volatility spillover and trading 
interference. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the economic revolution in 1979, the Chinese economy has gradually opened up to 
the world. There are two significant open-door policies specific to the stock market: the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) Scheme in 2013 and the Shanghai-Hong 
Kong Stock Connect (SHSC) in 2014. While the QFII regime allows qualified foreign 
investors to invest in Chinese stock markets, which were open only to domestic investors 
before, SHSC further opens up the market and allows all Hong Kong and international 
investors to invest in qualified Shanghai-listed shares. 
 
Despite its rapid development in the past 40 years, the Chinese equity market remains 
relatively new and is often considered less mature compared to developed equity markets 
such as those in the U.S. and Hong Kong. To protect inexperienced investors and serve as 
a market stabilization mechanism, daily price limits of 10% on regular stocks and 5% on 
stocks under special treatment have been in effect in Chinese stock markets since 1990. 
On the other hand, price limit regulations have never been implemented in Hong Kong. 
Given this intriguing fact, it would be interesting to see how the launch of SHSC, which 
ties the two equity markets much more closely, would impact on the effectiveness of 
China’s price limit policy. 
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Intuitively, SHSC is expected to increase the effectiveness of China’s price limit policy. 
Given the involvement of the more transparent Hong Kong market, information in the 
Chinese market should be transmitted more quickly, therefore helping the price limit to 
cut down excessive and panic trading arising from information asymmetry. On the other 
hand, the new bilateral investment channel may dampen the price limit’s ability to reduce 
market volatility during turmoil by allowing non-domestic investors to inject capital 
during market booms and withdraw funds during market crashes. Besides, given the 
relatively small turnover of SHSC compared to the whole market, it is questionable 
whether the policy could have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the price limit. 
 
This paper focuses on the impact of SHSC on price limit regulations in the Chinese stock 
market only. Despite the fact that Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect (SZSC), which 
is the first mutual access scheme between Shenzhen and Hong Kong stock markets, was 
subsequently launched in November 2016, the impact of SZSC is not studied because the 
available daily trading data on SZSC remain insufficient for proper analysis. 
 
We divide the panel data into different groups and begin our research by first 
investigating the distribution of price limit hit events. Then, we perform a regression 
analysis to check and compare the security betas of stock groups, which measure the 
tendency for their returns to respond to swings in the market. Next, we calculate the 
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abnormal return, volatility and trading activity of the groups. With these data, we examine 
the possible impact of SHSC on the effectiveness of price limits by testing three 
hypotheses: the volatility spillover hypothesis, the delayed price discovery hypothesis 
and the trading interference hypothesis. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background; Section 
3 is the literature review; Section 4 describes the sample data; Section 5 states the 
methodology; Section 6 shows and discusses the empirical results; Section 7 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect 
A major change in the structure of the Chinese stock markets has been underway since the 
launch of SHSC. On April 10, 2014, the China Securities Regulatory Commission and 
the Securities and Futures Commission made a joint announcement to approve, in 
principle, the development of the pilot program to establish mutual access between the 
mainland Chinese and Hong Kong stock markets. Seven months later, the program was 
officially launched on November 17, 2014. SHSC provides a cross-boundary investment 
channel between the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock markets so that investors of each 
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stock market can trade stocks listed on the other market through local clearing houses and 
brokers. This is a landmark event in the reform of the Chinese stock markets, as it relaxes 
restrictions and reshapes the financial structures of both Chinese and Hong Kong stock 
markets. For the first time, SHSC is able to provide a broad range of investors with a 
feasible, controllable and expandable channel for mutual market access between 
mainland China and Hong Kong, paving the way to the further opening up of the Chinese 
financial markets and RMB internationalization. This pilot program significantly 
increases the capital flow between Shanghai and Hong Kong stock markets in both 
directions, given that mainland Chinese investors have the opportunity to invest in the 
major companies listed in Hong Kong, while Hong Kong and international investors can 
access the Shanghai A-share market in a less restrictive manner than ever. This 
arrangement leads to both outward and inward financial market liberalization and enables 
intensive interactions between the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock markets. 
 
With Northbound Trading, all Hong Kong and international investors are able to purchase 
eligible shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) through their local brokers; 
only certain stocks in the Shanghai A-share market are included in Northbound Trading. 
Other products like exchange-traded funds, B-shares and other securities are not included. 
This trading arrangement also includes all constituent stocks (which are reviewed from 
time to time) of the SSE 180 Index and the SSE 380 Index, as well as the SSE A-listed 
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shares that are not included as constituent stocks of the above-mentioned indices but have 
corresponding H-shares listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK) except those 
which are not traded in RMB and are under risk alert. The number of total eligible 
Northbound Trading securities was 570 as at October 31, 2017 (568 as at November 17, 
2014). 
 
On the other hand, for Southbound Trading, eligible Chinese mainland investors, 
institutional investors and individual investors who have RMB 0.5 million in their 
investment and cash accounts, can purchase eligible shares listed on SEHK via their own 
local brokers. Southbound Trading only includes the constituent stocks of the Hang Seng 
Composite Large Cap Index, constituent stocks of the Hang Seng Composite Mid Cap 
Index, together with all H-shares that are not included as constituent stocks of the 
aforementioned indices but have corresponding A-shares listed in Shanghai, except for 
Hong Kong shares not traded in Hong Kong dollars and H-shares which have shares 
listed and traded not in Shanghai. The number of total eligible Southbound Trading 
securities was 310 as at October 31, 2017 (268 as at November 17, 2014). 
 
In the initial stage, trading under SHSC is subject to an annual aggregate quota, together 
with a daily quota. The Northbound Aggregate Quota and Daily Quota were set at RMB 
300 billion and RMB 13 billion respectively, while the Southbound Aggregate Quota and 
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Daily Quota were set at RMB 250 billion and RMB 10.5 billion respectively. From 
August 16, 2016 onwards, both the Northbound Aggregate Quota and the Southbound 
Aggregate Quota were abolished. From May 1, 2018 onwards, the Northbound Daily 
Quota is increased to RMB 52 billion, and the Southbound Daily Quota is increased to 
RMB 42 billion. Since its launch in 2014, the average daily turnover of Northbound 
Trading has stayed relatively stable at around RMB 2–3 billion, constituting around 1% 
to 4% of the average daily turnover of SSE. In contrast, the average daily turnover of 
Southbound Trading has increased rapidly in the past few years from around HKD 0.465 
billion in 2014, which is around 1% of the 2014 average daily turnover of SEHK, to 
around HKD 4.465 billion in 2017, which is around 7% of the 2017 average daily 
turnover of SEHK. 
 
Obviously, the implementation of SHSC has provided a new channel for both 
international and Chinese investors to access both the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock 
markets. It provides new opportunities for Chinese investors to diversify their investment 
portfolios with Hong Kong-listed stocks. On the other hand, it also provides new 
opportunities for international investors to invest in RMB, as they do not need to own an 
account in China. These gradual steps towards comprehensive financial liberalization 
will continue to accelerate the integration of Chinese financial markets into the rest of the 
world. 
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2.2 Price Limit Rule 
Price limits are literal boundaries set by authorities as a maximum range of upward and 
downward daily price movements. Therefore, setting price limits in the stock market is 
essentially a policy to restrict extreme daily security price movements and provide a 
cooling-off period for investors during panic trading. Today, such a mechanism has been 
widely adopted in countries such as Japan, Korea, Thailand and Malaysia. For instance, 
stocks listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) are only allowed to rise 
or fall daily by up to 30% of their previous closing prices. 
 
In 1990, the Chinese government first enacted the price limit policy for both upward and 
downward price movements to prevent the financial market from potentially causing 
social instability. The policy was once abolished in 1992 but resumed in December 1996. 
The policy allows the price of a stock to only move by ±10% of the closing price of the 
previous trading day. An exception is for newly listed stocks on their first public trading 
day or their first trading day after resumption, where ±20% price changes are allowed. 
Additionally, poor-performing firms will be assigned special treatment status, and a 
tighter price limit of ±5% daily will be imposed. In contrast to other countries where 
trading ceases after stocks hit the limits, SSE and SZSE allow trading to continue but only 
at prices within a specified range. If a stock hits its price limits for three consecutive days, 
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it will be suspended for half a trading day until an explanation is provided.  
 
As for the case of Hong Kong, price limit regulations have never been imposed in the 
stock market. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
There is limited existing literature studying SHSC. Zhang and Jaffry (2015) explored 
the influence of SHSC on the one-minute intraday high frequency volatility spillover 
between the two markets using asymmetric BEKK-GARCH models. The results 
indicated that while there was no volatility spillover in the pre-connection period, strong 
bidirectional volatility spillover existed in the connected period. Huo and Ahmed (2017) 
used dynamic forecasting techniques to show that the implementation of SHSC 
increases the conditional volatility of both stock markets. Ruan et al. (2018) examined 
the effects of financial liberalization on stock market co-movement using both 
multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis (MF-DFA) and multifractal detrended 
cross-correlation analysis (MF-DCCA). The results confirmed that there was an 
increase in the efficiency of the Shanghai stock market after the implementation of 
SHSC and verified the existence of persistent cross-correlation between the Shanghai 
and Hong Kong stock markets, which became stronger after the launch of the program. 
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Rather than concentrating on the increased capital linkage between the two markets, Fan 
and Wang (2017) showed that SHSC can significantly reduce the A-H share premium 
for dual-listed companies in Shanghai and Hong Kong markets. Burdekin and Siklos 
(2018) suggested that, notwithstanding the relatively small scale of SHSC, the 
Northbound and Southbound cash flows have meaningfully affected the A-H share 
premium post November 2014. Wang and Chong (2018) performed confirmed that a 
substantial number of A-share and H-share stocks began to co-integrate after the launch 
of the Shanghai–Hong Kong Stock Connection Scheme1 and the Shenzhen–Hong Kong 
Stock Connection Scheme, which demonstrates the effects of the two schemes in 
promoting financial integration and cross-border capital flows. 
 
In contrast, while there is a large amount of existing literature studying the price limit, the 
mechanism remains controversial. Proponents believe that price limits provide sufficient 
time for the identification of market information and the re-evaluation of the intrinsic 
value of stocks. Ma et al. (1989) argued that price limits provide a cooling-off period for 
the market and allow traders time to digest the causes of any substantial price revisions 
that culminate in the activation of the limits. The conclusion of Huang et al. (2001) is 
consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, which suggests that an overreaction is 
delayed and corrected by price limits; thus, the results support the validity of price limits. 
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Tian and Cao (2003) confirmed that price limits reduced the volatility of the Chinese 
stock market. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2005) found that the effect of price limits is 
asymmetric for bullish and bearish sample periods. During a bullish period, price limits 
effectively reduce the stock volatility of downward price movements and not upward 
price movements, whereas during a bearish period, price limits effectively reduce the 
stock volatility of upward price movements but not downward price movements. 
 
On the other hand, opponents believe that price limits hinder market information 
transmission, increase information asymmetry, delay price discovery and reduce market 
efficiency. They mainly focus on three hypotheses: the volatility spillover hypothesis and 
the delayed price discovery hypothesis by Fama (1989), as well as the trading 
interference hypothesis by Lauterbach and Ben-Zion (1993). Kim and Rhee (1997) 
empirically tested these hypotheses by investigating the impacts of price limits on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, and they compared stock volatility, trading volume and returns 
among all groups of stocks. Their findings support the three hypotheses and suggest that 
price limits may be ineffective. Qu (2007) researched the effects of price limits on the 
Chinese stock market. He substantiated the three hypotheses based on the existence of 
short selling restrictions and concluded that widening price limits would have a greater 
impact on market efficiency. Chang and Hsieh (2008) found no evidence supporting the 
volatility spillover hypothesis or the trading interference hypothesis. However, they 
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determined that delayed price discovery exists. Investors are more likely to purchase 
stocks that hit upper limits than to sell stocks that hit lower limits.Yeh and Yang (2013) 
found evidence of delayed price discovery and trading interference, and that the 
significance of these phenomena depends on the level of the price limits. Chong et al. 
(2016) explores the effects of price limits on the stock market of China during global 
market turmoils. It is found that the price limit system increases volatility significantly 
during the downward price movement. Moreover, price limit delays the efficient price 
discovery for upward and downward price movements.  
 
There is no existing literature that studies the relationship between mutual market access 
schemes and price limit regulations. This paper is the first to study this topic using SHSC 
data. 
 
4. Data 
 
This research investigates the impact of SHSC on the effectiveness of China’s stock 
market price limit regulations and therefore uses SSE data only. Despite the launch of 
SZSC, which is the first mutual access scheme between the Shenzhen and Hong Kong 
stock markets, in November 2016, the impact of SZSC is not the focus of this paper 
because the available data on SZSC remain highly insufficient. The number of trading 
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days up to October 31, 2017 is 674 for SHSC but only 207 for SZSC. 
 
Information on SSE-listed shares, including daily closing price, daily trading volume and 
daily total shares outstanding, are obtained from the WIND database. The sample period 
spans 951 trading days, starting from November 17, 2012 and ending on November 16, 
2016. While there are 481 trading days in the 2-year period before the launch of SHSC 
(Before), there are 470 trading days in the 2-year period after the launch (After). Only the 
companies which remain listed throughout the sample period are included in the panel 
data. Excluding stocks under special treatment, the sample data include 930 stocks in 
total, among which 556 are eligible for trading under SHSC (Covered) and 374 are not 
(Non-Covered). Other information, such as the daily return of the SSE Composite Index 
(rSSECI) and the 10-year China government bond yield (rCN10Y), is also captured to 
calculate the abnormal returns of securities. The panel data are divided into four groups, 
namely Covered Before, Non-Covered Before, Covered After and Non-Covered After, 
for comparison. Table 1 summarizes the sample panel data. 
 
We employ a traditional event study approach in this paper and identify all price limit hits 
as events. They are then divided into two types, upper price limits hits and lower price 
limit hits, to determine if there is any asymmetric effect. Due to the difficulty in 
analyzing the effect of consecutive day price limit hits, this paper only reports the results 
13 
of single day limit hits. 
 
5. Methodology 
 
We start our research by first analyzing the distribution of price limit hit events. Then, we 
perform a regression analysis to check and compare the security betas of the four groups, 
which measure the tendency for their returns to respond to swings in the market. 
 
The effectiveness of different types of price limits for different groups is examined by 
testing three hypotheses: the delayed price discovery hypothesis, volatility spillover 
hypothesis and trading interference hypothesis. 
 
The delayed price discovery hypothesis states that although price limits stop stock prices 
from rising or falling beyond a certain threshold on the hit day, stock prices are likely to 
move in the same direction in subsequent trading days until reaching its equilibrium. If 
price limits are ineffective and delay price discovery, we should observe price 
continuation in the market (i.e., positive abnormal return after upper limit hits and 
negative abnormal return after lower limit hits). If price limits are not ineffective and do 
not delay price discovery, then we may observe price reversal in the market (i.e., negative 
abnormal return after upper limit hits and positive abnormal return after lower limit hits). 
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We examine the hypothesis by first comparing the abnormal returns of different stock 
groups within the same time period (i.e., Covered Before versus Non-Covered Before and 
Covered After versus Non-Covered After). Then, we compare the returns of the same 
stock group across different time periods (i.e., Covered Before versus Covered After and 
Non-Covered Before versus Non-Covered After). Finally, we check if there are 
significant inter-stock-group temporal differences among groups, which represent the 
impact of SHSC on the effectiveness of price limits. Comparisons between returns after 
upper limits hits and lower limits hits are also performed to examine if there is similar 
impact brought by different types of hits. It is expected that SHSC would help prevent 
price continuation in the Chinese equity market, since the involvement of the more 
transparent Hong Kong market should accelerate information transmission, therefore 
helping price limits to reduce price continuation behavior, such as herding and panic 
trading, due to information asymmetry. 
 
The volatility spillover hypothesis claims that price limits cannot reduce overall stock 
price volatility. Although they can somewhat restrict the volatility of stock prices on the 
hit day, stock price volatility tends to increase over a long period of time afterwards. If 
price limits are ineffective and lead to volatility spillover, we should observe higher 
volatility in the days after the limit hits. If price limits are not ineffective and do not lead 
to volatility spillover, then we may only observe a one-day price volatility jump on the 
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hit day but not an increase in price volatility in the following days. We examine the 
hypothesis by first comparing the price volatility of different stock groups during the 
same time period. Then, we compare the price volatility of the same stock group across 
different time periods. Finally, we check if there are significant inter-stock-group 
temporal differences among the price volatility of groups, which represent the impact of 
SHSC on the effectiveness of price limits. Comparisons between price volatility after 
upper limits hits and lower limits hits are also performed to verify if there is similar 
impact brought by different types of hits. It is expected that SHSC would magnify stock 
price volatility in the Chinese equity market because the new bilateral investment 
channel allows non-domestic investors to inject capital during market booms and 
withdraw funds during market crashes, therefore dampening the price limit’s ability to 
reduce market volatility during turmoil. 
 
The trading interference hypothesis argues that although price limits drain the liquidity 
of stocks on the hit day, an increased number of trading activities would be observed in 
subsequent days. If price limits are ineffective and interfere with trading activity, we 
should observe increased trading activity after price limit hits. If price limits are not 
ineffective and do not interfere with trading activity, we may observe similar trading 
activity before and after price limit hits. We examine the hypothesis by first comparing 
the trading activity of different stock groups during the same time period. Then, we 
16 
compare the trading activity of the same stock group across different time periods. Finally, 
we check if there are significant inter-stock-group temporal differences among groups, 
which represent the impacts of SHSC on the effectiveness of price limits. Comparison 
between trading activity before and after upper limits hits and lower limits hits are also 
performed to ascertain if there is similar impact brought by different types of hits. It is 
expected that SHSC would bring more trading activity to the Chinese equity market 
because the program allows Hong Kong and international investors to invest in the 
market much more conveniently than before. We also expect there to be a more 
significant trading interference effect brought by upper price limit hits than lower price 
limit hits due to the magnet effect caused by investor behavior: inexperienced investors 
tend to be overly optimistic and buy stocks even after upper price limit hits in bullish 
markets but are hesitant to sell stocks that incur losses and instead await government 
intervention to raise stock prices even after lower price limit hits in bearish markets. 
 
6. Empirical Results and Discussion  
 
6.1 Analysis of Price Limit Hits and Security Betas 
Table 2 presents the distribution of price limit hits. In the 2-year period before the 
launch of SHSC, there were 1,258 upper price limit hits and 168 lower price limit hits 
for the Covered stock group. A similar trend can be observed in the Non-Covered stock 
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group, which had 1,139 upper price limit hits and 126 lower price limit hits. It is very 
obvious that there were far more upper price limit hits than lower price limit hits for 
both stock groups in the pre-SHSC period. As for the 2-year period after the launch of 
SHSC, 3,816 upper price limit hits and 3,324 lower price limit hits were recorded for 
the Covered stock group, whereas there were 3,209 upper price limit hits and 2,830 
lower price limit hits for the Non-Covered stock group. While the number of upper 
price limit hits tripled for both groups, the number of lower price limit hits increased 
even more significantly by almost 20 times in the post-SHSC period. 
 
Such uneven distribution could probably be explained by the general trend of the 
Chinese stock market. Chart 1 illustrates the performance of the SSECI. We can observe 
that the SSECI has been generally stable, fluctuating around the level of 2,000 since 
mid-2012. After underperforming in 2013, the market gradually rebounded in 2014 and 
skyrocketed from mid-2014. The SSECI surged for more than 23% within just half a 
year from a level of 2,005 on May 19, 2014 to a level of 2,478 on November 16, 2014. 
In light of the positive market sentiment, it is not surprising that there are far more 
upper than lower price limit hits in the pre-SHSC period. 
 
The bullish market atmosphere continues in early 2015, and the SSECI reaches its peak 
at the level of 5,178 on June 12, 2015, which was historically the second highest level 
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since the index’s establishment in 1990. However, market sentiment suddenly reversed 
upon the burst of the stock market bubble and the beginning of the 2015 Chinese stock 
market turbulence, mainly attributed to the tightened market regulation from the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and broadly decelerating growth of the 
Chinese economy. One third of the value of SSE-listed A-shares was lost within one 
month from mid-June 2015. By July 2015, the SSECI had plunged over 30 percent, and 
more than half of the listed companies had filed for a trading halt to prevent further 
losses. With the great effort of the Chinese government to stop the fall, the market 
experienced a small rebound in late 2015. However, a new round of market meltdown 
was set off again entering 2016. Trading was even halted on January 7, 2016 after the 
market fell for more than 7% within just 30 minutes of opening. Since then, the market 
has gradually recovered, and the SSECI slowly rose from its local minimum level of 
2,655 on January 28, 2016 to 3,205 on November 16, 2016. In light of such huge market 
turbulence, it is reasonable that the total number of price limit hits saw a drastic rise in the 
post-SHSC period. While the number of lower price limit hits increased greatly due to the 
market crash, the number of upper price limit hits also increased as a result of the 
temporary market recovery in late 2015. 
 
Given the noticeable difference in the number of price limit hits before and after the 
launch of SHSC, it is worthwhile to perform a regression analysis to check and compare 
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the security betas among groups, which measure their tendency of return in response to 
swings in the market. We first define ݎ௚,௧;௜,௝ as the daily return of stock i in stock group 
g for time period t on trading day j, where g = non-covered when stock i is in the 
Non-Covered stock group; g = covered when stock i is in the Covered stock group; t = 
before when trading day j is in the Before time period; t = after when trading day j is in 
the After time period. 
 
We can calculate ݎ௚,௧;௜,௝ according to 
 
ݎ௚,௧;௜,௝ ൌ ln	ሺ ௣೒,೟;೔,ೕ௣೒,೟;೔,ೕషభሻ     (1) 
 
, in which ݌௚,௧;௜,௝ and ݌௚,௧;௜,௝ିଵ denote the daily closing price of stock i in stock group g 
in time period t on trading days j and j-1 respectively. 
 
Then, we can calculate the average daily return of stocks in stock group g in time period 
t on trading day j, denoted as ̅ݎ௚,௧;௝ according to 
 
̅ݎ௚,௧;௝ ൌ ∑ ௥೒,೟;೔,ೕ
೙ೞ೒,೟
೔సభ
௡௦೒,೟      (2) 
 
, in which ݊ ݏ௚,௧ denotes the number of stocks in stock group g in time period t. 
 
According to Xu and Zhang (2014), pitfalls may arise if we directly apply the 
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Fama-French three-factor model to the Chinese stock returns, as several special features 
in China may considerably affect the explanatory power of the model, which is the 
outcome of decades of research on U.S. stock returns. Instead, we apply the simple 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to find the betas of stock groups. Using the return 
of SSECI (ݎௌௌா஼ூ ) as the return of market portfolio (rm), we can run the following 
regression: 
 
̅ݎ௚,௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݎௌௌா஼ூ ൅ ߝ௚,௧     (3) 
 
, in which  ̅ݎ௚,௧  is the average daily return of stocks in stock group g in time 
 period t; 
  ݎௌௌா஼ூ is the daily return of SSECI; 
 ߝ௚,௧ is the error term, 
where the number of observations is the number of trading days in time period t. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the single variable regressions. In Case (1), the dependent 
variable is the average daily return of stocks in the Non-Covered stock group in time 
period Before (̅ݎ௡௢௡ି௖௢௩௘௥௘ௗ,௕௘௙௢௥௘); in Case (2), the dependent variable is the average 
daily return of stocks in the Covered stock group in time period Before (̅ݎ௖௢௩௘௥௘ௗ,௕௘௙௢௥௘); 
in Case (3), the dependent variable is the average daily return of stocks in the 
Non-Covered stock group in time period After (̅ݎ௡௢௡ି௖௢௩௘௥௘ௗ,௔௙௧௘௥); in Case (4), the 
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dependent variable is the average daily return of stocks in the Covered stock group in 
time period After (̅ݎ௖௢௩௘௥௘ௗ,௔௙௧௘௥).  
 
We can observe an increase in betas for both stock groups after the launch of SHSC, 
probably because the 2015 Chinese stock market turbulence made both groups more 
sensitive to market trends in light of the overreaction from investors. We can also notice 
that the Covered stock group has a lower beta than the Non-Covered stock group both 
before and after the launch of SHSC, probably because the Covered stock group is made 
up mainly of blue-chip stocks, which are less subject to speculative activities. Difference 
in inter-stock-group beta is found to be narrowed after the launch of SHSC, probably 
because the price of blue-chip stocks also fell considerably in tandem with penny stocks 
during the market crash. 
 
To test whether the intertemporal, inter-stock-group and inter-stock-group temporal 
differences in beta are statistically significant, we perform the following regression: 
 
 ̅ݎ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݐ݅݉݁ ൅ ߚଶ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅ ߚଷݎௌௌா஼ூ ൅ ߚସݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅ ߚହݐ݅݉݁_ݎௌௌா஼ூ 
൅	ߚ଺݃ݎ݋ݑ݌_ݎௌௌா஼ூ ൅ ߚ଻ݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌_ݎௌௌா஼ூ ൅ ߝ      (4) 
 
, in which  ̅ݎ is the average daily return of stocks; 
22 
  ݐ݅݉݁ is a dummy variable 
 (time = 0 when t = before; time = 1 when t = after); 
 ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ is a dummy variable 
 (group = 0 when g = non-covered; group = 1 when g = covered); 
 ݎௌௌா஼ூ is the daily return of SSECI; 
 ݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ is the product of variables ݐ݅݉݁ and ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌; 
 ݐ݅݉݁_ݎௌௌா஼ூ is the product of variables ݐ݅݉݁	and ݎௌௌா஼ூ; 
 ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌_ݎௌௌா஼ூ is the product of variables ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	and ݎௌௌா஼ூ; 
 ݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌_ݎௌௌா஼ூ is the product of variables	ݐ݅݉݁, ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ and ݎௌௌா஼ூ; 
 ߝ is the error term. 
The number of observations is twice the total number of trading days. 
 
If β5 (the coefficient of ݐ݅݉݁_ݎௌௌா஼ூ ) in the regression is significant, then there is 
significant intertemporal beta difference in stock group g. If β6 (the coefficient of 
݃ݎ݋ݑ݌_ݎௌௌா஼ூ) in the regression is significant, then there is significant inter-stock-group 
beta difference in time period t. If β7 (the coefficient of ݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌_ݎௌௌா஼ூ) in the 
regression is significant, then there is significant inter-stock-group temporal difference 
in beta among the groups. 
 
Details of the above-mentioned regression results are not shown here. Instead, we 
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present the significance test result (at levels of 1%, 5% and 10%) of each difference 
term in Table 4. Since the inter-stock-group temporal difference term is shown to be 
insignificant, we conclude that SHSC does not have any significant effect on the beta of 
SSE-listed stocks. 
 
6.2 Tests on the Delayed Price Discovery Hypothesis 
We employed a traditional event study approach to examine the effectiveness of price 
limits, and all price limit hits are identified as events. Given the distribution of price limit 
hits as shown in Table 2, there are 13,179 events in total. We regard “Day 0” as the day 
when the price limit is hit; “Day −2” is 2 days before the hit; “Day −1” is 1 day before the 
hit; “Day 1” is 1 day after the hit; “Day 2” is 2 days after the hit, and so forth. 
 
We follow Li et al. (2014) and test the delayed price discovery hypothesis by examining 
the abnormal return of securities that hit the price limit. We first define ܾܽ݊ݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ as the 
abnormal daily return of the price limit hitting stock of event u in stock group g in time 
period t on Day v, where g = non-covered when the price limit hitting stock is in the 
Non-Covered stock group; g = covered when the price limit hitting stock is in the 
Covered stock group; t = before when event u occurs in the Before time period ; t = 
after when event u occurs in the After time period. We can calculate ܾܽ݊ݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ based 
on CAPM: 
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ܾܽ݊ݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ ൌ ݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ െ ܧሺݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ሻ ൌ 	 ݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ െ ሾݎ௙ ൅ ߚ௚,௧ሺݎ௠ െ ݎ௙ሻሿ     (5) 
 
, in which   ݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ denotes the daily return of the price limit hitting stock of 
event u in stock group g in time period t on Day v; 
 ܧሺݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ሻ denotes the expected daily return of the price limit hitting stock of 
event u in stock group g in time period t on Day v; 
 ݎ௙ denotes the daily return of risk-free investment; 
 ߚ௚,௧ denotes the beta of stock group g in time period t; 
 ݎ௠ denotes the daily return of market portfolio. 
 
Using the return of SSECI (ݎௌௌா஼ூ) as the return of market portfolio (rm) and 10-year 
China government bond yield (ݎ஼ேଵ଴௒) as the return of risk-free investment (rf), we then 
have 
 
ܾܽ݊ݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ ൌ ݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ െ ሾݎ஼ேଵ଴௒ ൅ ߚ௚,௧ሺݎௌௌா஼ூ െ ݎ஼ேଵ଴௒ሻሿ     (6) 
 
We can calculate the average abnormal daily return of the price limit hitting stocks of 
events in stock group g in time period t on Day v, expressed as ܾܽ݊ݎതതതതതതത௚,௧;௩, according to 
the following equation: 
 
ܾܽ݊ݎതതതതതതത௚,௧;௩ ൌ ∑ ௔௕௡௥೒,೟;ೠ,ೡ
೙೒,೟
ೠసభ
௡೒,೟      (7) 
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, in which  ݊௚,௧ denotes the number of events in stock group g in time period t. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 report the five average abnormal daily return of upper and lower price 
limit hitting stocks in the four groups (Non-Covered Before, Covered Before, 
Non-Covered After and Covered After) from Day -2 to Day 5. The figures demonstrate 
that upper price limit hits and lower price limit hits share similar results. Instead of price 
continuation (i.e., positive abnormal return after upper limit hits and negative abnormal 
return after lower limit hits), evidence of price reversal (i.e., negative abnormal return 
after upper limit hits and positive abnormal return after lower limit hits) is found in all 
groups. Therefore, delayed price discovery is not deemed to be a problem resulting from 
China’s price limit regulations. Besides, a general increase (decrease) in the abnormal 
return of upper price limit hitting stocks (lower price limit hitting stocks) after the launch 
of SHSC is perceptible, probably because the 2015 Chinese stock market turbulence not 
only increased the systematic risk level of the whole market but also elevated the 
unsystematic risk of each individual stock. We can also observe that the Covered stock 
group generally has a lower (higher) abnormal return than the Non-Covered stock group 
for upper price limit hits (lower price limit hits), probably because the Covered stock 
group has lower unsystematic risk, as it is made up mainly of blue-chip stocks, which 
have lower but less volatile return. 
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 To test whether the intertemporal, inter-stock-group and inter-stock-group temporal 
differences in abnormal daily return of the price limit hitting stocks of events on Day v are 
statistically significant, we perform the following regression: 
 
ܾܽ݊ݎ௩ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݐ݅݉݁ ൅ ߚଶ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅ ߚଷݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅ ߝ௩     (8) 
 
, in which ܽ ܾ݊ݎ௩ is the abnormal daily return of the price limit hitting stocks of all 
events on Day v; 
 ݐ݅݉݁ is a dummy variable 
 (time = 0 when t = before; time = 1 when t = after); 
 ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ is a dummy variable 
 (group = 0 when g = non-covered; group = 1 when g = covered); 
 ݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ is the product of variables ݐ݅݉݁ and ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌; 
 ߝ௩ is the error term. 
The number of observations is the total number of events. 
 
If β1 (the coefficient of ݐ݅݉݁) in the regression is significant, then there is significant 
intertemporal abnormal daily return difference in stock group g. If β2 (the coefficient of 
݃ݎ݋ݑ݌) in the regression is significant, then there is significant inter-stock-group 
difference in abnormal daily return in time period t. If β3 (the coefficient of 
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ݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌) in the regression is significant, then there is significant inter-stock-group 
temporal difference in abnormal daily return among the groups. 
 
Detailed results of the regressions above are not presented here. Instead, we include the 
significance test results (at levels of 1%, 5% and 10%) of the inter-stock-group, 
intertemporal and inter-stock-group temporal difference terms in Tables 5 and 6. Despite 
the fact that both the intertemporal and inter-stock-group differences are shown to be 
significant on Day 0, the inter-stock-group temporal difference on Day 0 is found to be 
insignificant. This means that after the general trend of the market is controlled for, SHSC 
shows no significant impact on the hit day’s abnormal return. Instead, we can observe 
significant inter-stock-group temporal difference on Day 2 with an earlier price reversal. 
It is thus believed that SHSC helps improve the delayed price discovery problem caused 
by China’s price limits. By bringing in the more transparent Hong Kong market, 
information is transmitted at a greater speed in the Chinese stock market, therefore 
reducing the amount of price continuation activity, such as herding and panic trading, 
arising from information asymmetry. 
 
6.3 Tests on the Volatility Spillover Hypothesis 
We follow Kim and Rhee (1997) and test the volatility spillover hypothesis by examining 
the price volatility of securities that hit the price limits. We measure the daily price 
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volatility of securities as follows:1 
 
ݒ݋݈௚,௧;௨,௩ ൌ ሺݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ሻଶ ∗ 1,000     (9) 
 
, in which ݒ݋݈௚,௧;௨,௩ denotes the daily price volatility of the price limit hitting stock of 
event u in stock group g in time period t on Day v; ݎ௚,௧;௨,௩ denotes the daily return of 
the price limit hitting stock of event u in stock group g in time period t on Day v. 
 
Then, we calculate the average daily price volatility of the price limit hitting stock of 
events in stock group g in time period t on Day v, expressed as ݒ݋݈തതതത௚,௧;௩, according to 
the equation below: 
 
ݒ݋݈തതതത௚,௧;௩ ൌ ∑ ௩௢௟೒,೟;ೠ,ೡ
೙೒,೟
ೠసభ
௡೒,೟      (10) 
 
, in which  ݊௚,௧ denotes the number of events in stock group g in time period t. 
 
Tables 7 and 8 report the average daily price volatility of upper and lower price limit 
hitting stocks in the four groups (Non-Covered Before, Covered Before, Non-Covered 
After and Covered After) from Day -2 to Day 5. The figures show that the price volatility 
                                                 
1 Another common measure of stock price volatility following Grossman (1988) is the natural log of the 
ratio of the daily highest price to the daily lowest price, i.e., voli,j = ln (hpi,j / lpi,j-1). Literature has shown 
that results generated form the two measures are similar. 
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of lower price limit hits is, in general, higher than that of upper price limit hits, which is 
probably due to investors engaging in panic trading during market crashes. Despite that, 
upper price limit hits and lower price limit hits share similar results. We can observe 
higher price volatility in days after the price limit hit compared to the days before; 
therefore, volatility spillover is deemed to be a problem caused by China’s price limit 
regulations. Besides, a general increase in price volatility after the launch of SHSC is 
visible, which is probably because of the onset of the 2015 Chinese stock market 
turbulence. However, we cannot observe any noticeable inter-stock-group difference in 
the price volatility between the Covered stock group and the Non-Covered stock group. 
 
To test whether the intertemporal, inter-stock-group and inter-stock-group temporal 
differences in daily price volatility of the price limit hitting stocks of events on Day v are 
statistically significant, we perform the following regression: 
 
ݒ݋݈௩ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݐ݅݉݁ ൅ ߚଶ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅ ߚଷݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅ ߝ௩     (11) 
 
, in which  ݒ݋݈௩ is the daily price volatility of the price limit hitting stocks of all 
 events on Day v; 
 ݐ݅݉݁ is a dummy variable 
 (time = 0 when t = before; time = 1 when t = after); 
 ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ is a dummy variable 
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 (group = 0 when g = non-covered; group = 1 when g = covered); 
 ݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ is the product of variables ݐ݅݉݁ and ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌; 
 ߝ௩ is the error term. 
The number of observations is the total number of events. 
 
If β1 (the coefficient of ݐ݅݉݁) in the regression is significant, then there is significant 
intertemporal daily price volatility difference in stock group g. If β2 (the coefficient of 
݃ݎ݋ݑ݌) in the regression is significant, then there is significant inter-stock-group daily 
price volatility difference in time period t. If β3 (the coefficient of ݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌) in the 
regression is significant, then there is significant inter-stock-group temporal daily 
difference in price volatility among the groups. 
 
Detailed results of the aforementioned regressions are not presented here. Instead, we 
include the significance test results (at levels of 1%, 5% and 10%) of the 
inter-stock-group, intertemporal and inter-stock-group temporal difference terms in 
Tables 7 and 8. Despite this, we can still recognize a number of significant intertemporal 
differences in the results, and no inter-stock-group difference is found to be significant. In 
addition, none of the inter-stock-group temporal difference is found to be significant. 
That means after the general market trend is controlled for, SHSC shows no significant 
impact on price volatility. This result does not match our prediction that SHSC would 
31 
magnify the stock price volatility in China’s equity market, since the new bilateral 
investment channel allows non-domestic investors to inject capital during market booms 
and withdraw funds during market busts, inhibiting the ability of China’s price limits to 
reduce market volatility during turmoil. One of the possible reasons for the insignificant 
impact of SHSC on price volatility may be the relatively small turnover size of SHSC 
when compared to the whole market. 
 
6.4 Tests on the Trading Interference Hypothesis 
We follow Kim and Rhee (1997) and test the trading interference hypothesis by 
examining the trading change (TC) of securities that hit the price limits. We first define 
trading activity (TA) as the ratio of daily trading volume to the daily total shares 
outstanding, calculated as follows: 
 
ܶܣ௚,௧;௨,௩ ൌ ௧௩೒,೟;ೠ,ೡ௢௦೒,೟;ೠ,ೡ     (12) 
 
, in which ܶܣ௚,௧;௨,௩ denotes the trading activity of the price limit hitting stock of event 
u in stock group g in time period t on Day v; ݐݒ௚,௧;௨,௩ denotes the daily trading volume 
of the price limit hitting stock of event u in stock group g in time period t on Day v; 
݋ݏ௚,௧;௨,௩ denotes the daily total shares outstanding of the price limit hitting stock of 
event u in stock group g in time period t on Day v. 
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Trading change (TC) is then computed as the logarithmic percentage change in trading 
activity from the previous day, i.e.,  
 
ܶܥ௚,௧;௨,௩ ൌ ln ൬ ்஺೒,೟;ೠ,ೡ்஺೒,೟;ೠ,ೡషభ൰ ∗ 100     (13) 
 
, in which ܶܥ௚,௧;௨,௩ denotes the trading change of the price limit hitting stock of event u 
in stock group g in time period t on Day v. 
 
Then, we calculate the average trading change of the price limit hitting stock of events in 
group g in time period t on Day v, expressed as ܶܥതതതത௚,௧;௩, according to this equation: 
 
ܶܥതതതത௚,௧;௩ ൌ ∑ ்஼೒,೟;ೠ,ೡ
೙೒,೟
ೠసభ
௡೒,೟      (14) 
 
, in which  ݊௚,௧ denotes the number of events in stock group g in time period t. 
 
Tables 9 and 10 report the average trading change of upper and lower price limit hitting 
stocks in the four groups (Non-Covered Before, Covered Before, Non-Covered After and 
Covered After) from Day -2 to Day 5. The figures indicate that the trading change of 
upper price limit hits is in general larger than that of lower price limit hits; one probable 
reason is that short selling is prohibited in the Chinese stock market. Another reason may 
be the magnet effect on investors’ behavior, which claims that inexperienced investors 
tend to be overly optimistic and buy stocks even after upper price limit hits in the bullish 
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market but are hesitant to sell stocks that incur losses and instead wait for government 
intervention to raise stock prices even after lower price limit hits in the bearish market. 
Despite the findings above, upper price limit hits and lower price limit hits share similar 
results. We note that the trading change in the days after the price limit hits is larger 
compared to the days before, therefore, trading interference is regarded as a problem of 
China’s price limit regulations. In addition, there is a general increase in trading change 
after the launch of SHSC, which is probably because of the start of the 2015 Chinese 
stock market turbulence. However, we cannot observe any notable inter-stock-group 
differences in price volatility between the Covered stock group and the Non-Covered 
stock group.  
 
To test whether the intertemporal, inter-stock-group and inter-stock-group temporal 
differences in trading change of the price limit hitting stocks of events on Day v are 
statistically significant, we perform the following regression: 
 
ܶܥ௩ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵݐ݅݉݁ ൅ ߚଶ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅ ߚଷݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅ ߝ௩     (15) 
 
, in which  ܶܥ௩ is the trading change of the price limit hitting stocks of all events on 
Day v; 
 ݐ݅݉݁ is a dummy variable 
 (time = 0 when t = before; time = 1 when t = after); 
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 ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ is a dummy variable 
 (group = 0 when g = non-covered; group = 1 when g = covered); 
 ݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ is the product of variables ݐ݅݉݁ and ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌; 
 ߝ௩ is the error term. 
 
If β1 (the coefficient of ݐ݅݉݁) in the regression is significant, then there is significant 
intertemporal trading change difference in stock group g. If β2 (the coefficient of ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌) 
in the regression is significant, then there is significant inter-stock-group trading change 
difference in time period t. If β3 (the coefficient of ݐ݅݉݁_݃ݎ݋ݑ݌) in the regression is 
significant, then there is significant inter-stock-group temporal difference in trading 
change among the groups. 
 
Detailed results of the foregoing regressions are not presented here. We instead include 
the significance test results (at levels of 1%, 5% and 10%) of the inter-stock-group, 
intertemporal and inter-stock-group temporal difference terms in Tables 9 and 10. 
Despite the fact that a number of significant intertemporal differences are perceptible in 
the results, no inter-stock-group difference is found to be significant. In addition, none of 
the inter-stock-group temporal difference is significant. This means that upon controlling 
for the general trend of the market, SHSC shows no significant impact on trading change. 
This result does not match our prediction that SHSC would bring in more trading 
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activity to China’s equity market because the program allows both Hong Kong and 
international investors to invest in the market in a much more convenient way than before. 
One of the possible reasons for the insignificant impact of SHSC on trading change may 
be the relatively small turnover size of SHSC as compared to the whole market. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
As a relatively safe instrument, the mutual market access scheme has been commonly 
used by China to gradually liberalize its financial market in recent years. Subsequent to 
the launch of SHSC and SZSC, the Chinese government introduced the Bond Connect 
(a mutual market access scheme between the Chinese and Hong Kong bond markets) in 
2017 and is now putting forward the Shanghai-London Stock Connect (a mutual market 
access scheme between Shanghai and London stock markets) to further open up the 
market. 
 
This paper studies the impact of such mutual market access schemes on China’s price 
limit regulations in the equity market by using the data of SHSC. The effectiveness of 
price limits is tested with three hypotheses: the delayed price discovery hypothesis, the 
volatility spillover hypothesis and the trading interference hypothesis. The results show 
that while SHSC has a significantly positive effect on the delayed price discovery 
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problem, its negative effects on the volatility spillover problem and the trading 
interference problem are found to be insignificant. 
 
Given the massive market turmoil in 2015, our data on the Chinese stock market are 
severely distorted. Research can be conducted in the future to further study the impact of 
SHSC on price limits in China’s equity market during tranquil periods. 
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9. Appendix 
 
Table 1: Summary of Sample Panel Data 
Covered Before Non-Covered Before 
Period Covered: November 17, 2012–  
 November 16, 2014 
Number of Trading Days: 481 
Number of Stocks Covered: 556 
Number of Price Limit Hits: 1,426 
Period Covered: November 17, 2012–  
 November 16, 2014 
Number of Trading Days: 481 
Number of Stocks Covered: 374 
Number of Price Limit Hits: 1,265 
Covered After Non-Covered After 
Period Covered: November 17, 2014–  
 November 16, 2016 
Number of Trading Days: 470 
Number of Stocks Covered: 556 
Number of Price Limit Hits: 7,140 
Period Covered: November 17, 2014–  
 November 16, 2016 
Number of Trading Days: 470 
Number of Stocks Covered: 374 
Number of Price Limit Hits: 6,039 
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Table 2: Distribution of Price Limit Hits 
 
Upward 
Price Limit
Hits 
% 
Downward 
Price Limit 
Hits 
% Total % 
Before SHSC 
(November 17, 
2012–  
November 16, 
2014) 
Covered 
Before 
1,258 47 168 6 1,426 53 
Non-Covered 
Before 
1,139 42 126 5 1,265 47 
Total 2,397 89 294 11 2,691 100 
 
After SHSC 
(November 17, 
2014–  
November 16, 
2016) 
Covered 
After 
3,816 29 3,324 25 7,140 54 
Non-Covered 
After 
3,209 24 2,830 21 6,039 46 
Total 7,025 53 6,154 47 13,179 100 
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Chart 1: The Shanghai Composite Index (SSECI) from Nov 17, 2012 to Nov 17, 2016 
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Table 3: Single Variable Regression Results 
Variables 
(1)  
rnon-covered, before 
(2)  
rcovered, before 
(3)  
rnon-covered, after 
(4)  
rcovered, after 
Constant 0.02063 0.009219 0.015071 0.009654 
rSSECI 1.168521*** 1.088619*** 1.202831*** 1.144806*** 
     
Observations 470 470 481 481 
R-Square 0.418 0.4969 0.3551 0.435 
This table shows the single variable regression results. Asterisks (***, **, *) denote that the coefficient is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Comparison of Securities Betas 
(1) 
Non-Covered Before 
(2) 
Covered Before 
(2 - 1) 
Inter-Stock-Group Difference 
1.168521 1.088619 -0.079902 * 
(3) 
Non-Covered After 
(4) 
Covered After 
(4 - 3) 
Inter-Stock-Group Difference 
1.202831 1.144806 -0.058025 
(3 - 1) 
Intertemporal 
Difference 
(4 - 2) 
Intertemporal 
Difference 
(4 -1) 
Inter-Stock-Group Temporal 
Difference 
0.034310 0.056187 -0.023715 
This table presents and compares the securities betas of the four groups. Asterisks (***, **, *) denote that the 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Average Abnormal Daily Returns (Upper Price Limit Hits) 
Day (1) Non-Covered Before 
(2) 
Covered Before 
(2) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 0.0043  0.0022 -0.0021  
-1 0.0081  0.0046 -0.0035  
0 0.0576  0.0448 -0.0128 *** 
1 0.0174  0.0147 -0.0027  
2 0.0084  0.0075 -0.0009  
3 -0.0051  -0.0027 0.0024  
4 -0.0039  -0.0025 0.0014  
5 0.0047  0.0029 -0.0018  
Day (3) Non-Covered After 
(4) 
Covered After 
(4) – (3) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 0.0072  0.0038 -0.0034  
-1 0.0093  0.0064 -0.0029  
0 0.0724  0.0623 -0.0101 ** 
1 0.0191  0.0153 -0.0038  
2 0.0111  -0.0045 -0.0156 *** 
3 -0.0067  -0.0013 0.0054 * 
4 -0.0049  0.0047 0.0096 ** 
5 0.0052  0.0040 -0.0012  
Day 
(3) – (1) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
(4) – (2) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
 (4) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Temporal 
Difference 
-2 0.0029  0.0016 -0.0005  
-1 0.0012  0.0018 -0.0017  
0 0.0148 *** 0.0175 *** 0.0047  
1 0.0017  0.0006 -0.0021  
2 0.0027  -0.0120 *** -0.0129 *** 
3 -0.0016  0.0014 0.0038  
4 -0.0010  0.0072 ** 0.0086 ** 
5 0.0005  0.0011 -0.0007  
This table presents and compares the average abnormal daily returns of the four groups for upper price limit hits. 
Asterisks (***, **, *) denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Comparison of Average Abnormal Daily Returns (Lower Price Limit Hits) 
Day (1) Non-Covered Before 
(2) 
Covered Before 
(2) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 -0.0054  -0.0039 0.0015  
-1 -0.0087  -0.0077 0.0010  
0 -0.0576  -0.0454 0.0122 *** 
1 -0.0096  -0.0082 0.0014  
2 -0.0083  -0.0061 0.0022  
3 0.0061  0.0052 -0.0009  
4 0.0043  0.0038 -0.0005  
5 -0.0055  -0.0048 0.0007  
Day (3) Non-Covered After 
(4) 
Covered After 
(4) – (3) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 -0.0082  -0.0077 0.0005  
-1 -0.0097  -0.0086 0.0011  
0 -0.0696  -0.0584 0.0112 ** 
1 -0.0127  -0.0110 0.0017  
2 -0.0097  0.0055 0.0152 *** 
3 0.0072  0.0034 -0.0038  
4 0.0044  0.0009 -0.0035  
5 -0.0076  -0.0049 0.0027  
Day 
(3) – (1) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
(4) – (2) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
 (4) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Temporal 
Difference 
-2 -0.0028  -0.0038 -0.0023  
-1 -0.0010  -0.0009 0.0001  
0 -0.0120 ** -0.0130 *** -0.0008  
1 -0.0031  -0.0028 -0.0014  
2 -0.0014  0.0116 ** 0.0138 *** 
3 0.0011  -0.0018 -0.0027  
4 0.0001  -0.0029 -0.0034  
5 -0.0021  -0.0001 0.0006  
This table presents and compares the average abnormal daily returns of the four groups for lower price limit hits.  
Asterisks (***, **, *) denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Comparison of Average Daily Price Volatility (Upper Price Limit Hits) 
Day (1) Non-Covered Before 
(2) 
Covered Before 
(2) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 2.0857  2.0281 -0.0576  
-1 2.0484  2.0653 0.0169  
0 9.5972  9.5430 -0.0542  
1 2.2906  2.2400 -0.0506  
2 2.2095  2.1867 -0.0228  
3 2.1461  2.1431 -0.0030  
4 2.1147  2.1559 0.0412  
5 2.1391  2.1214 -0.0177  
Day (3) Non-Covered After 
(4) 
Covered After 
(4) – (3) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 2.1007  2.1248 0.0241  
-1 2.2157  2.1620 -0.0537  
0 9.7282  9.6703 -0.0579  
1 2.4813  2.4296 -0.0517  
2 2.3485  2.2927 -0.0558  
3 2.1832  2.2351 0.0519  
4 2.2471  2.2023 -0.0448  
5 2.2375  2.1841 -0.0534  
Day 
(3) – (1) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
(4) – (2) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
 (4) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Temporal 
Difference 
-2 0.0150  0.0967 * 0.0391  
-1 0.1673 * 0.0967 * 0.1136  
0 0.1310 * 0.1273 * 0.0731  
1 0.1907 ** 0.1896 ** 0.1390  
2 0.1390 * 0.1060 * 0.0832  
3 0.0371  0.0920 * 0.0890  
4 0.1324 * 0.0464 0.0876  
5 0.0984 * 0.0627 0.0450  
This table presents and compares the average daily price volatility of the four groups for upper price limit hits. 
Asterisks (***, **, *) denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
52 
Table 8: Comparison of Average Daily Price Volatility (Lower Price Limit Hits) 
Day (1) Non-Covered Before 
(2) 
Covered Before 
(2) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 2.2574  2.2252 -0.0322  
-1 2.2765  2.2250 -0.0515  
0 9.6910  9.6373 -0.0537  
1 2.5463  2.5097 -0.0366  
2 2.3467  2.3226 -0.0241  
3 2.3057  2.3654 0.0597  
4 2.3497  2.2977 -0.0520  
5 2.2354  2.2823 0.0469  
Day (3) Non-Covered After 
(4) 
Covered After 
(4) – (3) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 2.3323  2.2836 -0.0487  
-1 2.2864  2.3157 0.0293  
0 9.8017  9.7573 -0.0444  
1 2.6767  2.6303 -0.0464  
2 2.4645  2.4236 -0.0409  
3 2.3944  2.3757 -0.0187  
4 2.4401  2.3504 -0.0897  
5 2.2888  2.3176 0.0288  
Day 
(3) – (1) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
(4) – (2) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
 (4) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Temporal 
Difference 
-2 0.0749  0.0584 0.0262  
-1 0.0099  0.0907 * 0.0392  
0 0.1107 * 0.1200 * 0.0663  
1 0.1304 * 0.1206 * 0.0840  
2 0.1178 * 0.1010 * 0.0769  
3 0.0887 * 0.0103 0.0700  
4 0.0904 * 0.0527 0.0007  
5 0.0534  0.0353 0.0822  
This table presents and compares the average daily price volatility of the four groups for lower price limit hits. 
Asterisks (***, **, *) denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: Comparison of Average Trading Change (Upper Price Limit Hits) 
Day (1) Non-Covered Before 
(2) 
Covered Before 
(2) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 1.2121 1.8005 0.5884  
-1 2.8293 2.0935 -0.7358  
0 64.9418 58.8284 -6.1134  
1 -65.8883 -58.2081 7.6802  
2 10.3442 13.0656 2.7214  
3 -3.0768 5.7411 8.8179  
4 2.8136 -2.5995 -5.4131  
5 1.8822 2.6794 0.7972  
Day (3) Non-Covered After 
(4) 
Covered After 
(4) – (3) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 1.6142 2.8205 1.2063  
-1 1.8038 2.0662 0.2624  
0 74.8522 66.6111 -8.2411  
1 -65.6162 -59.5399 6.0763  
2 3.4918 -2.9408 -6.4326  
3 -1.989 2.7571 4.7461  
4 2.7052 2.941 0.2358  
5 2.3484 2.1808 -0.1676  
Day 
(3) – (1) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
(4) – (2) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
 (4) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Temporal 
Difference 
-2 0.4021  1.0200 1.6084  
-1 -1.0255  -0.0273 -0.7631  
0 9.9104 * 7.7827 1.6693  
1 0.2721  -1.3318 6.3484  
2 -6.8524  -16.0064 ** -13.2850  
3 1.0878  -2.9840 5.8339  
4 -0.1084  5.5405 0.1274  
5 0.4662  -0.4986 0.2986  
This table presents and compares the average trading change of the four groups for upper price limit hits. 
Asterisks (***, **, *) denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10: Comparison of Average Trading Change (Lower Price Limit Hits) 
Day (1) Non-Covered Before 
(2) 
Covered Before 
(2) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 2.1712 0.4382 -1.7330  
-1 3.2175 -1.0284 -4.2459  
0 54.1649 46.6863 -7.4786  
1 -53.2093 -47.4181 5.7912  
2 3.1411 1.3169 -1.8242  
3 -2.1973 2.4807 4.6780  
4 0.1711 -2.4675 -2.6386  
5 1.2184 0.4035 -0.8149  
Day (3) Non-Covered After 
(4) 
Covered After 
(4) – (3) 
Inter-stock-group Difference 
-2 1.3145 -0.3333 -1.6478  
-1 4.4906 -1.4677 -5.9583  
0 64.4183 60.6218 -3.7965  
1 -67.4656 -59.7221 7.7435  
2 -13.1853 -18.3132 -5.1279  
3 2.1359 5.2653 3.1294  
4 -1.0324 3.2009 4.2333  
5 1.9431 -0.1128 -2.0559  
Day 
(3) – (1) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
(4) – (2) 
Intertemporal  
Difference 
 (4) – (1) 
Inter-stock-group Temporal 
Difference 
-2 -0.8567  -0.7715 -2.5045  
-1 1.2731  -0.4393 -4.6852  
0 10.2534 * 13.9355 * 6.4569  
1 -14.2563 * -12.3040 * -6.5128  
2 -16.3264 ** -19.6301 ** -21.4543  
3 4.3332  2.7846 7.4626  
4 -1.2035  5.6684 3.0298  
5 0.7247  -0.5163 -1.3312  
This table presents and compares the average trading change of the four groups for lower price limit hits. 
Asterisks (***, **, *) denote that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
